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Case No. 20050504-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for forgery, a third degree felony, and theft, a 
class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(West 2004). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Do defendant's forgery and theft convictions merge where neither 
crime contains all the elements of the other and the evidence supports 
separate convictions? 
"Merger issues present questions of law, which [this Court] review[s] for 
correctness." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 10, 55 P.3d 1131, cert, denied, 63 P.3d 
104 (Utah 2003). 
2. Was evidence that defendant and her friend ordered $45 of random 
food from a fast food restaurant and used an obviously forged check to 
pay for it sufficient to sustain defendant's forgery conviction? 
"'In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, [this Court] reverse[s] a jury 
verdict only when the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt.5" State v. Boss, 2005 UT 
App 520, \ 9, 127 P.3d 1236 (quoting State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 65, 27 P.3d 1115). 
3, Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's 
motion for a mistrial based upon a single reference to defendant's 
spouse being on probation? 
"A trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial and its 
decision will remain undisturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.'5 State v. Mahi, 2005 
UT App 494, f 10, 125 P.3d 103 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004) (theft); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West 2004) (forgery); 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with forgery, a third degree felony, and theft, a class B 
misdemeanor (R. 1-2). A jury convicted her on both counts (R. 75; R. 163:109). Two 
months later, defendant filed a motion to dismiss (R. 81-83). She then filed a motion to 
arrest judgment (R. 105-113). The trial court denied both motions (R. 133, 136). It then 
2 
sentenced defendant to suspended terms of zero-to-five years in prison for the forgery and 
180 days in jail for the theft (with credit for one day served), and placed her on thirty-six 
months' probation (R. 143-46). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 150). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Forgery and Theft 
On January 4, 2004, defendant and her friend Melanie Alvery pulled up to a drive-
though window at a Sonic restaurant in Spanish Fork, where Misty Pierce worked as an 
assistant manager (R. 163:42, 44, 55). After pulling up to the microphone, defendant or 
Alvery placed what Pierce described as an "odd order" (R. 163:44). Pierce described the 
discussion taking place between Alvery and defendant while they placed their order: "Do 
you want to try this? Let's get this. Oh, look, this sounds good. This looks good" (R. 
163:45). Defendant and Alvery ordered "[t]ons of just different little orders" totaling $45 
(R. 163:45, 47). After ordering, defendant drove her truck to the cashier window, where 
Pierce could see that she was accompanied by another woman and a child (R. 45-46). 
Pierce recognized defendant, who was an acquaintance of hers, and engaged in 
casual conversation while defendant's order was filled (R. 163:46). Defendant then 
handed Pierce a check for $45 (R. 163:46-47, 56; St. Exh. 1). Defendant received the 
food and drove away (R. 163:48, 49). 
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Later that evening, Pierce examined the check and discovered that it belonged to 
Dr. Glen Walker (R. 163:48). She called Dr. Walker to confirm that the check was 
stolen, and then called the police (R. 163:49). 
Dr. Walker testified that he had not authorized defendant or any other party to 
endorse his checks, which had been stolen from his storage unit the previous November 
(R. 163:38-40). Tests comparing the writing on the check to defendant's handwriting 
were inconclusive (R. 163:73). 
Defendant's Story 
Defendant testified at trial. She admitted that she had driven the truck to Sonic, 
but denied placing the order, or knowing that the check was forged (R. 163:55, 56, 58). 
According to defendant, Alvery offered to buy dinner for defendant's two children before 
babysitting them that evening (R. 163:55, 60). Defendant testified that she and her 
husband, who was waiting at her home, did not eat any of the food (R. 163:58). 
Defendant testified that Ms. Pierce was not the person who took her order or 
greeted her at the drive-thru window (R. 163:57, 62). In fact, she "was shocked [Ms. 
Pierce] was working that night" (R. 163:57). However, defendant testified, when she 
noticed Ms. Pierce, she asked the person at the window to call her over (R. 163:57-58, 
62). 
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When asked about the check, defendant testified that, although she saw Alvery 
writing it out, she never actually looked at the check, even when she passed it to the Sonic 
cashier (R. 163:56,61-62). 
Finally, when asked by the prosecutor, defendant testified that, despite being 
charged with a felony crime in this case, she never talked with Alvery about check and 
never "ask[ed] her to go to the police so [she] wouldn't get in trouble for this" (R. 
163:65-66). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in not merging her forgery 
and theft convictions. This Court should reject defendant's claim because she has not 
adequately briefed it. In any case, neither the elements of the two crimes nor the evidence 
used to prove them provides a basis for merger in this case. Thus, defendant's claim fails. 
Issue II. Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her 
convictions. Specifically, defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish 
"the mental state required to convict of 'forgery' or 'theft.'" This Court should reject 
defendant's claim because she fails to marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's 
verdicts. In any case, evidence that a defendant passed a forged check under suspicious 
circumstances is sufficient to support an inference that the defendant knew the check was 
forged. Such evidence exists here. Evidence that defendant knowingly uttered a forged 
check then provides the evidence necessary to establish her intent to commit theft. 
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Issue III. Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
her mistrial motion. However, three of the four grounds defendant now raises were not 
raised before the trial court. Thus, this Court should not consider them. Concerning the 
fourth ground, the trial court acted within its discretion in ruling that the officer's passing 
reference to defendant's husband's probation status was not so prejudicial as to render 
defendant's trial unfair. Defendant's claim, therefore, fails. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S FORGERY AND THEFT CONVICTIONS DO NOT 
MERGE WHERE NEITHER CRIME CONTAINS ALL THE 
ELEMENTS OF THE OTHER AND THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS 
SEPARATE CONVICTIONS 
Defendant claims that her convictions for theft and forgery should merge because 
both crimes "rely on the exact same facts - passing of the check from the passenger to the 
cashier." Aplt. Br. at 9 (unnumbered). This Court should reject defendant's claim as 
inadequately briefed. Alternatively, defendant's claim fails on its merit. 
"Merger is a judicially-crafted doctrine available to protect criminal defendants 
from being twice punished for committing a single act that may violate more than one 
criminal statute." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, ^  17, 55 P.3d 1131. The doctrine 
exists in two forms. The first is now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. See State v. 
Perez-Avila, 2006 UT App 71, % 10, 131 P.3d 864; State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, Tf 32,128 
P.3d 1179. The second is drawn from the supreme court's merger analysis in State v. 
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243. See Lee, 2006 UT 5, ffi[ 30-31. 
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Section 76-1-402 provides that, "[a] defendant... may not be convicted of both 
the offense charged and [an] included offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (West 
2004). Under this section, "an offense qualifies as a lesser included offense when the 
offense 'is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged.'" Perez-Avila, 2006 UT App 71, f 10 (quoting § 
76-l-402(3)(a)). In other words,"'[i]f the greater offense "cannot be committed without 
necessarily having committed the lesser, then the lesser offense merges into the greater 
crime."5" State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, If 12, 72 P.3d 692 (quoting State v. Yanez, 
2002 UT App 50, % 21,42 P.3d 1248), cert denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2003). "Tn most 
cases, comparison of the statutory elements will suffice to determine whether a greater-
lesser relationship exists.'" State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, Tf 10, 71 P.3d 624 
(quoting State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 241 (Utah App. 1997)). However, "where the two 
crimes have multiple variations," this Court"' consider[s] the evidence to determine 
whether the greater-lesser relationship exists between the specific variations of the crimes 
actually proved at trial.'" Id. (quoting Ross, 951 P.2d at 241) (additional citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
If merger does not occur under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402, this Court must then 
consider whether the offenses merge under "the Finlayson factors." Lee, 2006 UT 5, 
ff 31-32. Under Finlayson, even if the crimes contain distinct elements, if the nature of 
the crimes are so related that "both [crimes] may arise from the same facts," this Court 
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'"must look beyond the statutory elements and compare the evidence.'" Id. (quoting 
Smith, 2003 UT App 179, \ 12). 
A. This Court should reject defendant's claim because she has not 
adequately briefed it. 
Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed. Thus, this Court should reject it. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a defendant's 
brief "shall contain . . . citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied 
on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Under this rule, "[a]n adequate brief is one that fully 
identifies and analyzes the issues with citation to relevant legal authority." Lee, 2006 UT 
5, f 22 (citing State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, If 11, 108 P.3d 710). "Mere 'bald citation to 
authority,' devoid of any analysis, is not adequate." Id. (quoting State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 
1, U 31, 973 P.2d 404); see also State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (holding 
that rule 24(a)(9) "[ijmplicitly . . . requires not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority"). 
In short, this Court simply "will not engage in constructing arguments 'out of 
whole cloth' on behalf of defendants." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 n.2 (Utah App. 
1990) (citation omitted). Consequently, when the appellant fails to present any relevant 
authority, the reviewing court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 
UT 24, f 12, 69 P.3d 1278. Similarly, "[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful 
analysis, [the court will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, 
\ 12, 52 P.3d 467. Rather, courts will simply "decline to consider inadequately briefed 
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{ 
arguments. " State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v. 
Norris, 2001 UT 104, \ 28, 48 P.3d 872; State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, ] 13, 72 P.3d 
138. 
In this case, defendant's argument consists of citation to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402 and numerous cases. See Aplt. Br. at 8-10. However, nowhere does defendant 
identify the tests required to determine whether two offenses merge, let alone apply those 
tests to the crimes at issue here. See id. Rather, she merely cites the general statute that 
"'[a] defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may 
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense,'" id. at 8 (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)), and then provides very brief summaries of cases in 
which offenses unrelated to her case merge, id. at 8-10. 
Nowhere in defendant's argument does she compare the statutory elements of 
forgery with the statutory elements of theft. See Smith, 2003 UT App 179, % \2;Chukes, 
2003 UT App 155, f 10; Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, ^  21; Ross, 951 P.2d at 241. Nor does 
she anywhere fairly identify the evidence relied upon by the State to establish those 
elements. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ffif 31-32; Smith, 2003 UT App 179, ^  12; Chukes, 2003 UT 
App 155, \ 10; Ross, 951 P.2d at 241. Thus, defendant's argument is "[m]ere 'bald 
citation to authority,' devoid of any analysis." Lee, 2006 UT 5, ^ 22 (citation omitted). 
Because defendant "fails to offer any meaningful analysis," this Court should 
"decline to reach the merits" of her claim. Gamer, 2002 UT App 234, ^ 12; see also 
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Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 31; Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,113; 
Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 28; Bryant, 965 P.2d at 549. 
B. Even on its merits, defendant's claim fails. 
Even if this Court reaches the merits of defendant's claim, it fails because 
defendant's forgery and theft convictions do not merge. 
Forgery is proscribed under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West 2004): 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or 
with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by 
anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters 
any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the 
writing or . . . utterance purports to be the act of another, 
whether the person is existent or nonexistent.... 
In contrast, a person commits theft when "he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). 
A comparison of these two crimes indicates that neither is a lesser included offense 
of the other. First, the statutes contain different elements. Forgery, under any of its 
variations, requires proof of a writing purporting to be the act of another; theft does not. 
Theft requires proof of unauthorized control over the property of another; forgery does 
not. Thus, either crime can "'be committed without necessarily having committed the 
other.'" Smith, 2003 UT App 179,112 (quoting Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, f 21); Chukes, 
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2003 UT App 155, ^  10; Ross, 951 P.2d at 241. Consequently, forgery and theft do not 
merge under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. See Smith, 2003 UT App 179, f 12; Chukes, 
2003 UT App 155, ^  10; Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, ^ 21; Ross, 951 P.2d at 241. 
Nor do the two crimes merge under any evidentiary analysis. Contrary to 
defendant's claim, her convictions for forgery and theft do not "rely on the exact same 
facts—passing of the check from the passenger to the cashier." Aplt. Br. at 9. Rather, 
defendant's conviction for forgery was based on her utterance of a forged check to Sonic 
regardless of whether she ever received any food in exchange. See R. 163:32 (prosecutor 
stating in opening that "[a]t the end of our evidence,... [w]hat I'll do is ask you to find 
[defendant] guilty of passing [the] forged check"); R. 163:98 (prosecutor arguing in 
closing: "I ask that you come back with guilty on . . . the forgery, that she passed that 
forged check in the dollar amount of $45"); see also State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 1272, 
1276 (Ariz. App. 1982) ("The crime of forgery is complete when one either makes or 
passes a false instrument with intent to defraud," and "[i]t is not necessary that the 
instrument be accepted"); McGirt v. State, 708 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Ark. 1986) ("The crime 
of forgery was complete upon [defendant's] being in possession of the forged instrument, 
or upon his attempt to pass the check, or upon his passing the check"); People v. 
Cunefare, 102 P.3d 302, 307 n.4 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) (holding that "forgery is 
complete when the act and guilty knowledge coincide with the intent to defraud" and that 
"[i]t is not necessary that the person receiving the forged instrument be actually defrauded 
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to complete the crime"); State v. Weigel, Ml A.2d 372, 375 (NJ. Super. 1984) (holding 
that, "[i]f the forger has fraudulent intent, and the writing could have been relied on as 
legally significant, the crime of forgery is complete" and "it is not necessary to prove that 
the person against whom the fraud is directed has in fact been defrauded"); State v. 
Odom, 64 S.W.3d 370, 372 (Tenn. Cr. App. 2001) (holding that crime of forgery "is 
complete by the forgery with fraudulent intent, whether any third party be actually injured 
or not," and thus, that the crime is "complete whether or not the defendant receives any 
property or services") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant's theft conviction, in contrast, was based on her accepting food from 
Sonic in exchange for the forged check after the forgery had already been completed. See 
R. 163:32 (prosecutor stating in opening argument that he would ask jury to find 
defendant guilty of forgery for "passing [a] forged check. And then, for the amount of 
money that she took, that.. . will be the theft charge that you'll be asked to find her guilty 
on"); R. 163:98 (prosecutor arguing in closing "that they stole from Sonic Burger is the 
theft."). 
Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, she was not convicted of two crimes "[b]ased 
on a single act." Aplt. Br. at 10. Rather, defendant's uttering the forged check to the 
Sonic cashier supports her forgery conviction; her acceptance of food from Sonic in 
exchange for that check supports her theft conviction. 
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In sum, neither a comparison of the elements of forgery and theft nor a comparison 
of the evidence supports defendant's merger claim. Thus, her claim fails. 
II. EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT AND HER FRIEND ORDERED 
$45 OF RANDOM FOOD FROM A FAST FOOD RESTAURANT 
AND USED AN OBVIOUSLY FORGED CHECK TO PAY FOR IT IS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S FORGERY 
CONVICTION 
Defendant claims that "the State has failed to meet their burden of proof 
referencing knowledge" because "[n]o credible evidence existed to indicate the 
defendant's knowledge that the check was forged." Aplt. Br. at 10-11. Thus, according 
to defendant, the State failed to prove that she had "the mental state required to convict of 
'forgery' or 'theft.'" Aplt. Br. at 11. Defendant's claim fails, first, because she does not 
marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdicts. Her claim fails, second, because the 
evidence—including defendant's testimony—supports the jury's verdicts. 
As previously stated, a person commits forgery "if, with purpose to defraud 
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:" 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such 
altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or . . . utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West 2004). A person commits theft when "he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). 
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A. This Court should reject defendant's claim because she fails to 
marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdicts. 
This Court should not reach defendant's insufficiency claim because defendant has 
failed to marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdicts. 
"A party claiming that the evidence does not support a jury's verdict carries a 
heavy burden." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). First, a 
defendant's "brief must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial that supports the very findings it resists." State v. 
Waldron, 2002 UT App 175, <J 13, 51 P.3d 21 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). "After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Co., 818P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991)). In other words, the defendant must 
"marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Waldron, 2002 UT 
App 175, f 13, 51 P.3d 21. A defendant's failure to marshal the evidence "allows [this 
Court] to affirm the court's findings on that basis alone." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 
H 61, 28 P.3d 1278; see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
In this case, defendant has not marshaled all the evidence supporting her 
convictions. Specifically, defendant has failed to marshal the following evidence: 
1. On January 4, 2004, defendant and a friend, Ms. Alvery, ordered $45 worth 
of food at a Sonic Restaurant drive-thru window (R. 163:45,47). 
14 
Misty Pierce, the Sonic employee who took defendant's order, testified that 
she heard two females deciding what to order (R. 163:34). 
Pierce, who knew defendant, testified that one of the people placing the 
order "sounded like" defendant (R. 163:45). 
Pierce described the order as "odd," like what "[w]e would ca l l . . . a drive-
off order," where "it just kind of sounds like they're ordering randomly off 
the order board They would order a large amount of food and then just 
drive right through" (R. 163:44). In this case, Pierce testified, "It was, Do 
you want to try this? Let's get this. Oh, look, this sounds good. This looks 
good. Tons of just different little orders off—almost one thing from every 
section of the order board that we had" (R. 163:45). 
Pierce testified that defendant then drove up to Ms. Pierce's window in a 
white truck, accompanied by a female in the passenger seat and a boy in the 
back (R. 163:46). 
Pierce testified that, after engaging in some "small chitchat" with 
defendant, defendant gave her a check in the amount of $45 for the food (R. 
163:46). 
Pierce testified that defendant was then given the food that had been 
ordered (R. 163:49). 
A short while later, Pierce noticed that the check defendant had given her 
belonged to Glen H. Walker MD Inc. (R. 163:49). 
Dr. Walker's name appeared on the check in bold capital letters (St. Exh. 
i). 
Ms. Pierce called Dr. Walker, who confirmed that the check had been stolen 
from his storage unit the previous November (R. 163:39-40, 49). 
Defendant testified that she went to Sonic that night because when Ms. 
Alvery, her babysitter, came over, "she was hungry and she wanted to get 
something to eat so I took her to Sonic to get something to eat" (R. 163:55). 
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12. Defendant testified that, because Alvery was hungry, Alvery agreed to buy 
dinner for herself and defendant's two children, ages 13 and 8 (R. 163:55-
56, 60). 
13. Defendant testified that only she and Alvery were in the truck when they 
went to Sonic (R. 163:58). According to defendant, Ms. Pierce was 
"mistaken" when she testified that a boy was also in the truck (R. 163:58, 
59). 
14. Defendant testified that, although she did "help[] [Alvery ] decide what the 
kids might want," she herself did not place the order but instead "just let 
[Alvery ] speak over me because she was ordering" (R. 163:58). 
15. Defendant testified that Ms. Pierce "wasn't the one who took our order. 
When I pulled up, I was shocked she was working that night" (R. 163:57). 
16. Defendant testified that, when she drove up to the window, "[t]here was a 
lady, one of [Ms. Pierce's] workers, there. I passed the check to her" (R. 
163:57, 62). Defendant testified that, after passing the check, defendant 
asked the worker whether she could speak with Ms. Pierce (R. 163:57). 
17. Defendant testified that the food ordered was just for Alvery and 
defendant's two children (R. 163:58). Defendant testified that it "[d]idn't 
seem like [Alvery ] ordered that much food, but I really wasn't paying 
attention to exactly how much she was getting" (R. 163:57). "I thought it 
was just one bag" (R. 163:59). 
18. Defendant testified that Alvery wrote out the check to Sonic (R. 163:61). 
Defendant testified that she saw Alvery writing out the check but could not 
recall whether Alvery had torn the check out of a checkbook or just had a 
single check that she was writing out (R. 163:64). 
19. Defendant testified that she did not have anything to do with completing the 
check. "Just when [Alvery ] handed it to me. I just handed it to the 
cashier." Defendant testified that, despite her close proximity to Alvery in 
the truck, she did not look at the check either while Alvery was writing it 
out or as she was passing it (R. 163:56, 62). 
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20. Defendant testified that, despite being charged with a felony crime in this 
case, she never talked with Alvery about it and never "ask[ed] her to go to 
the police so you wouldn't get in trouble for this" (R. 163:65). 
21. Defendant testified that she never offered to give the police a handwriting 
sample to compare with the writing on the check. In fact, "I was never 
talked to by the police" (R. 163:66). 
22. Officer Richard Hales, of the Spanish Fork Police Department, testified 
that, when he arrested defendant, he "gave her the opportunity to talk to me 
about" the incident, but that "[s]he chose not to" (R. 163:72). 
23. Officer Hales testified that a comparison had been done between the 
handwriting on the check and a handwriting sample he had received from 
defendant previously and that the comparison "[c]ame back inconclusive" 
(R. 163:73). 
By omitting these critical pieces of circumstantial evidence supporting defendant's 
convictions—including how defendant's testimony conflicted with Ms. Pierce's and 
Officer Hales—defendant has failed to meet her marshaling burden. Thus, this Court 
should not consider her insufficiency claim. 
B. Even if this Court reaches defendant's claim, it fails on its 
merits. 
Even if this Court excuses defendant's marshaling failure, defendant's claim 
nonetheless fails. 
"In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, [this Court] reverse[s] a jury 
verdict only when the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Boss, 2005 UT 
App 520, f 9, 127 P.3d 1236 (quoting State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 65, 27 P.3d 1115). 
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"[This Court] examine[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict." Id. 
(citing State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, j^ 18? 70 P.3d 111). "'So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops.'" Id. (quoting Mead, 
2001UT58,f67). 
Here, the evidence, properly marshaled, supports defendant's convictions. First, 
the evidence establishes that the check defendant uttered to Sonic was a forgery. Under 
Utah law, this evidence alone is sufficient to establish defendant's guilty knowledge 
under the forgery statute. See State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ^  13, 988 P.2d 949 
("Under current Utah law, a person who merely utters a forged instrument can be inferred 
to have had knowledge of the forgery.") (citing State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 
(Utah 1985)). 
Second, the record contains substantial other evidence supporting such a finding. 
"Knowledge or intent is a state of mind generally to be inferred from the person's conduct 
viewed in light of all the accompanying circumstances." Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 
T[ 10. Moreover, "[bjecause of the difficulty of proving knowledge and intent in a 
prosecution for forgery, the quantum of evidence the State must produce before an 
inference of knowledge or intent will arise should not be unrealistically burdensome." Id. 
Thus, so long as the prosecutor presents "some facts or circumstances from which an 
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inference can logically be drawn/'—such as "irregularities on the face of the instrument 
or particular circumstances of the transaction"—such an inference may properly be made. 
In this case, "the particular circumstances of the transaction" combined with 
defendant's self-serving testimony were sufficient to support an inference that defendant 
knew the check was forged. First, Ms. Pierce's testimony concerning the transaction 
supported an inference of defendant's knowledge. Ms. Pierce testified that she was the 
person who took defendant's order that night (R. 163:34). According to Ms. Pierce, the 
two women in the truck seemed almost to be ordering items randomly, so much so that 
she initially thought the order was a "drive-off order," where a car orders a large quantity 
of random food and then leaves without picking it up (R. 163:44-45). 
Second, the unconvincing nature of defendant's testimony also supported an 
inference that she knew the check was forged. For example, defendant and her friend's 
food order totaled $45 (R. 163:46). Yet, according to defendant's testimony, the food 
was only intended to feed one adult and two pre-teen children (R. 163:58). Moreover, 
although those two pre-teen children were hers, defendant testified that her babysitter 
agreed to pay the $45 bill (R. 163:55-56, 60). 
In addition, defendant's testimony concerning her trip to Sonic conflicted 
substantially with Ms. Pierce's testimony. Ms. Pierce testified that she overheard two 
women in the truck randomly deciding what to order (R. 163:44-45). Defendant testified 
that the babysitter primarily decided what to order and that defendant only suggested 
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certain menu items for the children (R. 163:58). Ms. Pierce testified that she was at the 
window when defendant drove up to pay for the order (R. 163:46). Defendant testified 
that another person was at the window, that she was "shocked" to see Ms. Pierce "was 
working that night," and that Ms. Pierce came over to chat only after defendant requested 
to speak with her (R. 163:57, 62). Ms. Pierce testified that three people—the two women 
and a pre-teen boy—were in the truck when it arrived at the window (R. 163:46). 
Defendant testified that only the two women were present (R. 163:58-59). 
Then, defendant testified that the forged check was written by her babysitter even 
though the $45 worth of food was, in part, to feed defendant's two children (R. 163:55-
56, 58, 60). Defendant also testified that, although she saw the babysitter completing the 
check, she never actually looked at the check while the babysitter was writing it out; nor 
did she look at the check when she took it from the babysitter and passed it to the Sonic 
cashier (R. 163:163:56, 62). Yet, the doctor's name on the check was in bold capital 
letters (St. Exh. 1); even a quick and unintentional glance at the check would have 
disclosed the suspicious nature of the check. 
And, finally, although defendant testified that she did not know when she handed 
the check to Sonic that her babysitter had forged it, defendant never confronted the 
babysitter or asked the babysitter to clear defendant's name—even after being charged 
with a felony forgery in this case (R. 163:65). 
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All of this evidence supports the inference that defendant knew that the check she 
uttered to Sonic was forged and, thus, that she acted with the intent to defraud necessary 
to convict her of forgery. See Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, \ 10; see also State v. 
Wallace, 2005 UT App 434,f15, 124 P.3d 259 (noting that, in a sufficiency claim, a 
defendant's self-serving testimony does not assist defendant because "the jury may simply 
have believed [other witnesses'] testimony over [defendants"); State v. Stringham, 957 
P.2d 602, 610 (Utah App. 1998) (noting that "when the evidence presented is conflicting 
or disputed," this Court "will not disturb the jury's credibility determinations"). And, 
evidence supporting defendant's forgery also provided sufficient circumstantial evidence 
of defendant's intent to commit the subsequent theft. 
Consequently, defendant's claim "[n]o credible evidence existed to indicate the 
defendant's knowledge that the check was forged," and thus that the State failed to prove 
"the mental state required to convict of 'forgery' or 'theft,'" Aplt. Br. at 10,11, fails. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL BASED 
ON A SINGLE REFERENCE TO DEFENDANT'S SPOUSE BEING 
ON PROBATION 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying "defendant's motion for 
mistrial after the State introduced improper character evidence." Aplt. Br. at 1, 17. 
Specifically, defendant claims that a mistrial should have been granted after the State 
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(1) introduced evidence that an officer "suspected defendant had associated with [the 
babysitter] in a separate forgery where the [babysitter] was suspected"; (2) introduced 
evidence that defendant "had been arrested on a separate unrelated offense"; 
(3) suggested that defendant had been "fired from a job for stealing"; and (4) "[a]dvising 
the jury that the defendant's husband was on supervised probation." Aplt. Br. at 1, 7,16. 
Defendant's mistrial motion, however, was only based on the reference to 
defendant's husband's probation. Thus, defendant's claim that a mistrial should have 
been granted based on the other allegedly improper evidence is unpreserved and should 
not be reached. Defendant's preserved claim fails on its merits. 
A. Proceedings below. 
After the State's case in chief, defendant testified on her own behalf. On cross-
examination, the State questioned defendant about other instances during which she had 
been with the babysitter when the sitter passed checks (R. 163:66-69). Defendant 
testified that she had been with the babysitter on one other occasion when the sitter 
passed a check at Wendy's (R. 163:66). She denied being with the sitter when the sitter 
passed a check at a store called Urban Snow & Skate (R. 67-69). 
The State then questioned defendant about her prior work experience at an Extra 
Mart (R. 163:69-70). When the prosecutor asked defendant, "Isn't it true you were fired 
from there for stealing?" defense counsel objected: 
Objection, Judge. I've let him go far afield. At this point, I think 
we're way beyond anything of relevance. He hasn't connected 
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anything up. 1 don't see any relevance to this. I don't know where 
he's going, but I think it's inadmissible. 
(R. 163:70). The trial court sustained the objection (R. 163:70). 
The prosecutor then called Officer Richard Hales, the investigating officer in this 
case, in rebuttal (R. 163:72). Officer Hales testified that, at one point, he "attempted] to 
make contact with [defendant]" about this case (R. 163:72). The prosecutor asked, "And 
what happened when you did that?" (R. 163:72). The officer testified, "What happened is 
there was an arrest warrant issued for her. At the time of her arrest, I gave her the 
opportunity to talk to me about it" (R. 163:72). Defense counsel did not object to the 
officer's response (R. 163:72). 
The prosecutor then called Sergeant Gary Giles as a rebuttal witness. Sergeant 
Giles testified that he had spoken with defendant about the check that had been passed at 
Urban Snow & Skate (R. 163:75). The prosecutor then asked Sergeant Giles "what did 
you speak with [defendant] about?" (R. 163:75). When the officer responded, 
"[b]asically, the situation at Urban Snow & Skate that had been reported to the police 
department was that two females had come into the shop, purchased several items" (R. 
163:75), defense counsel objected to the testimony as unresponsive hearsay (R. 163-75-
76). The trial court sustained the objection (R. 163:76). 
The prosecutor then asked the officer whether he had spoken with defendant about 
the matter. When the officer responded that he had, the prosecutor asked, "How did you 
get ahold of her?" (R. 163:76). When the officer stated, "I got ahold of her with a phone 
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number I got from her husband's probation officer," defense counsel objected and 
requested a hearing outside the jury's presence (R. 163:76). After the jury was removed, 
defense counsel moved for a mistrial: 
Now, through the voluntary submission of testimony by Mr. Giles, 
we know [defendant's] husband is on probation. This is nothing more than 
a smear campaign by the State to try to get at her in some form. I don't 
know if [the prosecutor] knew her husband was on probation or that Mr. 
Giles was going to say that, but that's improper testimony, and there's no 
justification by any means. I'd ask the Court to consider issuing a mistrial 
on this matter. 
(R. 163:77). The trial court denied defendant's motion: 
Let's stay away from it. It has a taint of prejudice. It's not such that 
it amounts to the level of a mistrial. It's not the defendant that he's 
referring to. It's her husband. But it is somewhat prejudicial. I don't think 
it's so prejudicial it's going to affect the outcome of this case. That's what 
I'm considering for a mistrial. But I would admonish you to—I'm not 
saying you're trying to. Just stay away from it. 
(R. 163:77). 
Defense counsel then asked if he could have a proffer of the officer's anticipated 
testimony (R. 163:77). When the prosecutor indicated that he intended to elicit prior bad 
acts evidence under rule 404(b) from the officer, defense counsel objected because he 
"had no notice" (R. 163:79). After further discussion, the trial court ruled that the 404(b) 
evidence would have been admissible if it had been offered during the State's case-in-
chief; however, the court ruled, the evidence was not proper rebuttal evidence (R. 163:79-
85). 
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During closing argument, the prosecutor did not refer to any of the evidence 
defendant now challenges in closing argument (R. 163:89-98, 106-07). 
B. This Court should not consider that part of defendant's claim 
which is based on grounds not raised below. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion for mistrial after 
the State improperly (1) introduced evidence that an officer "suspected defendant had 
associated with [the babysitter] in a separate forgery where the [babysitter] was 
suspected"; (2) introduced evidence that defendant "had been arrested on a separate 
unrelated offense"; and (3) suggested that defendant had been "fired from a job for 
stealing." Aplt. Br. at 1, 7, 16. This Court should reject defendant's claims because she 
did not raise them below and does not argue plain error on appeal. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claims.'" State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 
1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)); see 
also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, H 11, 10 P.3d 346. "Moreover, the issue must be 
'sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court and must be 
supported by evidence or relevant authority.'" State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, j^ 13, 95 P.3d 
276 (quoting State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, \ 19, 58 P.3d 879 (additional quotation 
marks)); see also Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah 
App. 1996) (holding objection at trial must "'be specific enough to give the trial court 
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notice of the very error . . . complained of") (quoting Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. V. 
Square D. Co., 699 P.2d 8595 860 (Utah 1983)). 
The preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, f 11; see also State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) 
("Because Pledger does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' 
justifies a review of the issue, we decline to consider it on appeal."); State v. Brown, 856 
P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993). If a defendant "does not argue that exceptional 
circumstances or plain error justifies review of the issue," this Court will "decline to 
consider it on appeal." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5; see also State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 
15, % 45, 114 P.3d 551; State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 35, n.5, 27 P.3d 1115. 
Here, defense counsel never moved for a mistrial based on the three grounds listed 
above. See R. 163:66-69 (not objecting to prosecutor's questions to defendant concerning 
whether she was with babysitter when sitter passed other bad checks); R. 163:75-76 
(objecting to Sergeant Giles reference to Urban Snow & Skate incident involving two 
females, but not moving for mistrial); R. 163:72 (not objecting to Officer Hales' 
testimony that an arrest warrant had been issued for defendant); R. 163:69-70 (objecting 
to prosecutor's question to defendant concerning whether she had previously been fired 
from a job for stealing, but not moving for mistrial). Defendant therefore did not preserve 
these claims below. See Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 13; Holgate, 2000 UT 74, TJ11. 
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Because defendant did not preserve these claims below, they may be reached on 
appeal only if defendant argues either plain error or exceptional circumstances. See 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11; Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45; Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 35; Pledger, 
896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. Because defendant makes neither argument here, this Court should 
not consider her claims. 
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
defendant's mistrial motion on the only ground raised below. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying "defendant's motion for 
mistrial after a State witness "[a]dvis[ed] the jury that the defendant's husband was on 
supervised probation." Aplt. Br. at 1, 7,16. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
"A trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial and its 
decision will remain undisturbed absent an abuse of that discretion." State v. Kohl, 2000 
UT 35, ^ 20, 999 P.2d 7 (citations omitted). Moreover, "[b]ecause a [trial] judge is in an 
advantaged position to determine the impact of courtroom events on the total 
proceedings, once a district court has exercised its discretion and denied a motion for a 
mistrial, we will not reverse the court's decision unless it 'is plainly wrong in that the 
incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair 
trial.'" State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11,1f 39, 108 P.3d 780 (quoting State v. Wach, 2001 UT 
35,145, 24 P.3d 948); see also State v. Mahi, 2005 UT App 494, \ 10,125 P.3d 103. 
In this case, nothing in the record "shows that the [trial] court's decision is plainly 
wrong." Mahi, 2005 UT App 494, ^  10. First, the record shows that the trial court did 
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consider the prejudicial nature of the probation reference before concluding that the 
single reference was not "so prejudicial [that] it's going to affect the outcome of this 
case" (R. 163:77). Second, although the trial court denied defendant's mistrial motion, it 
nonetheless gave a curative instruction informing the jury that the court had sustained 
defendant's objection and that "[y]ou're not to consider the question that was asked or 
any of the possible answers that could have been given, as you've been instructed 
previously in my preliminary instructions" (R. 163:86). Finally, nothing in the record 
suggests that a single reference to the probation status of defendant's husband "'so likely 
influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial.'" Allen, 
2005 UT 11,1f 39 (quoting Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 45); see also id., 2005 UT 11, H 40 
(noting that appellate courts will not find an abuse of discretion if "improper statements] 
[are] not intentionally elicited, [are] made in passing, and [are] relatively innocuous"). 
Thus, defendant's claim fails 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED °J June 2006. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KARENA.KLUCZNHC 
Assistant Attorney General 
28 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on / June 2006,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to Sheldon R. Carter, 
Harris & Carter, 3325 North University Avenue, Suite 200, Jamestown Square, 




§ 7 6 - 1 - 4 0 2 . Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode— 
Included offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act 
of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which 
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the 
act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or convic-
tion and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single crimi-
nal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepara-
tion to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; 
or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the 
verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment 
of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, 
if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 4 . Theft—Elements 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 5 0 1 . Forgery—"Writing" defined 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such 
altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, 
or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execu-
tion, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports 
to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or 
purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence 
other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such 
original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, 
and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by 
a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest 
in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
R U L E 24 . BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant I lie brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated; 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be 
set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking i e\ lew ul an issue not preserved 
in the trial court 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of 
this rale. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below, A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review si \, 111 
follow All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments, ihe summary of arguments, suitably para-
graphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in 
the body of the brief. It shall not be a meie repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons 
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall 
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(ll) \n addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is 
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the 
brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is 
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a tabic of contents. The adden-
dum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of initial 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of 
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the 
appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter 
service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance 
to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the 
court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatis-
fied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the adden-
dum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the 
appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured 
person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursu-
ant to Faile 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. 
If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
referenc e shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in 
length The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the 
appellant and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file 
a brief which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appel-
lee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to theissues raised in 
the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's 
answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first brkf 
The lengths specified by this paragraph are exclusive of table of contents, table 
of authorities, and addenda. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the 
court for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that 
exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the 
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good 
cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the 
date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before 
the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be 
accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the 
motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of 
additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is 
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for the 
supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and 
shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
